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Obtaining a Loan Under
False Pretenses ..
The Colorado Law
By JEROME SMITH*
A question has come up in a local criminal case which has doubtless
been passed upon by the various district courts, but oddly enough has
never been before our state Supreme Court. We believe that a discussion
of the question will be of interest to the members of the bar.
The question is: Can one who obtains a loan of money by false
representations as to his financial responsibility be prosecuted under Section 305 of our Criminal Code? Section 305 reads in part as follows:
"Obtaining goods under false pretenses-Penalty.-If any
person or persons shall knowingly and designedly, by any false
pretense or pretenses, obtain from any other person or persons any
chose in action, money, goods, wares, chattels, effects or other valuable thing whatsoever, with intent to cheat or defraud any such
person or persons of the same, every person so offending shall be
deemed a cheat, and upon conviction, shall, where the property
obtained is over the value of twenty dollars, be imprisoned in the
penitentiary not to exceed ten years; * * *"

If this section could be read alone, the answer to our question would
be simple indeed, for the language of the section is broad enough to include the fraud of obtaining money on credit, but in Colorado we have
in our Criminal Code another section in point, Section 3 16, to-wit:
"False pretenses of character or responsibility in writingPenalty.-If any person, by false representation in writing of his
own responsibility, wealth or mercantile correspondence and connection, shall obtain a credit thereby, defraud any person or persons
of money, goods, chattels or any valuable thing, or if any person
shall cause or procure others to teport falsely of his honesty, wealth
or mercantile character, and by thus imposing on any person or
persons, obtain credit, arid thereby fraudulently get into possession
of goods, wares, merchandise or any valuable thing, every such
offender shall be deemed a swindler, and on conviction shall be
sentenced to return the property so fraudulently obtained, if it can
be done, and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, and
imprisoned in the county jail n~t exceeding six months."
*Of the Colorado Bar, Greeley, Colorado.
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Both of the quoted sections have been Colorado law since the earliest days.
Is obtaining a loan of money "obtaining credit" under Section
316? The courts have uniformly held that it is. (24 A. L. R. 400,
citing many cases.)
If then, such an offense can be prosecuted under
Section 316, our next question is: Must it be? Since there is a special
statute relating to obtaining credit under false pretenses, does the general
false pretenses statute become inapplicable? In at least two jurisdictions
where there are statutes like ours this precise point has been ruled upon.
(Lucas v. Illinois, 75 Ill. App. 662; Commonwealth v. Boyd, 181 Ky.
382, 205 S. W. 390.)
In the Illinois case one Lucas borrowed $100 from one Metcalf as
the result of Lucas' false oral representation that he was a man of certain
wealth. The lower court overruled a motion to quash the indictment,
but the appeal court reversed the ruling, saying in part:
"As we view it, the proper construction to place upon the two
sections is that section 96 [like our Sec. 305] was intended to include cases where the defrauded party parted with his money in
some other sense than as a loan, and that where the loan was procured by the false representation of the borrower as to his solvency,
the case falls within section 97 [like our Sec. 3161 provided the
representation was in writing, of course."
Since the representation was oral, the case fell under neither Section 96
nor Section 97 and the court ruled that the motion to quash the indictment should have been sustained,
In the Kentucky case, under identical facts and similar statutes, the
appeal court sustained the lower court's quashing of the indictment, saying in part:
"The latter section [like our Sec. 3161 'doubtless was dictated by the knowledge that criminal charges of false pretenses are
often instituted in reality tw compel the payment of debt and are
easily fabricated.' "
The holdings in these cases are apparently in accord with recognized
principles of statutory construction:
59 Corpus Juris 1056: "(d) General and Specific Statutes.
Where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and
comprehensive terms, and another dealing with a part of the same
subject in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect
to a consistent legislative policy * * *. It is a fundamental rule
that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the
same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special
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act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether
it was passed before or after such general enactment * * *."
An early Illinois case well illustrates these principles of statutory
construction. In this case (114 Ill. 320, 2 N. E. 55) the court was
asked to determine whether the word "whoever" in a general larceny
statute was broad enough to include "constables." Reading this statute
by itself, the answer wtuld clearly be "yes." But since there was a
special statute governing larceny by constables, the court said "no":
"It is true that the word 'whoever' * * * has a broad or comprehensive meaning; but at the same time it is unreasonable to believe that the legislature intended that a constable should be prosecuted under both sections of the statute."
In passing a special act the minds of the legislators were necessarily
directed to the details of the special case and it is not probable that they
should intend by a general act to derogate from that special intention.
If one obtaining credit by false pretenses can be prosecuted under Section
305, then Section 3 16 loses its meaning, both as a statute designed to
prevent fabricated cases by requiring the false representations to be in
writing, and as one designed to mark the offense of obtaining credit by
false pretenses as less serious, because of the well-recognized human failing to puff and overstate one's financial position when he is in desperite
circumstances and in need of a loan, often without real criminal intent.
There is but one fly in the ointment.
Prior to 1891, the latter part of Sectiono305 included a concluding
sentence which was omitted in the amended statute of that year. This
sentence read: "This section shall not apply to sales of property on
credit." The change of the statute in 1891 was primarily for the purpose of increasing the penalty for the offense of false pretenses. Why
was the quoted sentence omitted? It would seem that the omission,
instead of repealing Section 3 16 (general statutes do not repeal special
statutes by implication-86 Colo. 249), was either inadvertent, or intended to delete unnecessary language. The Kentuky statute referred
to has no sich statement expressly limiting its scope, nor under the principles discussed heretofore would such an express limitation be necessary.
In any event it is hiard to believe that the legislature intended to
greatly increase the penalty under Section 305 (one year minimum to
ten years maximum) and at the same time put within the scope of that
section for the first time cases of obtaining credit through false pretenses,
when custom and justice dictate both a lighter penalty and stricter proof
(characteristics of Sec. 31.6) than for the ordinary case of false pretenses.
However, the law is uncertain and should be clarified by legislative
enactment or a Supreme Court decision.

Fearing Hell As Essential
to Validity of Affidavit
By FRANK SWANCARA*
Applicable case law is conflicting on the proposition that any affidavit can be legally assailed and judicially declared a nullity where it is
found that the affiant does not fear that deposing falsely would result in
divine punishments after death. Assuming that some old cases are controlling or persuasive authority, one bounded by adversaries and intending to make an affidavit affecting them ought, as a precautionary measure,
to publicly profess the protective beliefs, agreeing for example, with the
doctrine, invoked by Judge Jefferies,' concerning "eternal flames" and
"the bottomless lake of fire and brimstone." The reason is that an oath
or affirmation is part of an affidavit, and at common law there can be no
oath unless the person attempting to make it has some belief in divine
punishments for infidelity to an oath. A Connecticut court 2 would not
permit Mr. Scott to take the oath as a witness because what be believed
was "that men were punished in this life for their sins." A New York
court' announced the rule that no one is a competent witness, or oath
taker, unless he believes in divine punishments-"in the world to come."
The New York court did not explain the mode -and duration of the
punishment "in the world to come," but possibly there was a silent
agreement with Jonathan Edwards, mentioned here because quoted in a
4
New Hampshire opinion.
One of the old cases seals a blow even to the theory that the Bill
of Rights grants to everyone the "privilege or capacity" of taking an oath,
making an affidavit, etc., without regard to his opinions on theological
subjects. The Ohio judges7 seized upon the clause, which we also have
in Section 4 of our Bill of Rights, providing that "the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed'to dispense with oaths and
affirmations." They held that a person disqualified under the common
law to make an oath, becauae of absence of belief in divine punishments,
remains disqualified, and in spite of the fact that th Constitution also
*Of the Denver Bar.
'Quoted in Section 1816_, Wigmore on Ev. (2d-ed.).
The judge said: "* * *
that God of Heaven may justly strike thee into eternal flames and make thee drop into
the bottomless lake-of fire and brimstone, if thou offer to deviate the least from the
truth * * *"
2Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66
(1828).
'Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 103 (1820).
'Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 7, 163, where the court quoted Edwards thus: "The
God who holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider or some loathsome
insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked. * "* * The sight of helltorments will exalt the happiness of the saints for ever. * * *"
'Clinton v. The State, 33 Ohio St. 27 (1877).
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provided that no person is incompetent as a witness "on account of his
religious belief."
They assumed that a constitutional retention of
"oaths and affirmations" is a retention also of all the common law requisites for competency to make an oath.
The Ohio decision, a scarecrow in the field of case law, need not,
as yet, terrorize anyone, for there is much persuasive authority to the
effect that any person may take an oath, and be a witness or affiant, without regard to his opinions, under a Bill of Rights like ours, which provides that "no person shall be denied any * * * privilege or capacity, on
account of his opinions concerning religion.'' 6 The question is still unsettled, for in 1883 our legislature acted as if uncertain whether the Bill
of Rights already fully protected witnesses, and passed an act providing
that no persons "shall be excluded" as witnesses "on account of their
opinions on matters of religious belief. "
In a sense, affiants too are
''witnesses," but the act as a whole shows that the legislative intent was
to liberate only those who are "witnesses" in the ordinary sense; that is,
those who testify orally or by deposition in a judicial proceeding. The
same is true of the territorial act of 1872, concerning competency of
witnesses."
The distinction between "witness" and "affiant" was recognized
in a case where it was held that a free man of color, incompetent as a
witness against a white man, could, as "incident to his freedom," make
an affidavit in a proceeding to compel a white man to give a peace bond.9
Suppose that in Colorado a citizen makes affidavit before a Justice of the
Peace, deposing that someone threatens to do bodily harm. The J. P.,
having taken an oath to support the Constitution (which preserves oaths
and affirmations), can cross-examine the complainant, and if he finds
that the latter does not fear "the bottomless lake of fire and brimstone,"
he can, according to the reasoning in some opinions, ignore the complaint
and refuse to issue a warrant, for there is no oath, the affiant being incapable of making one under the common law. Where there is no oath
or affirmation, there is no affidavit. Charles Bradlaugh had in fact said
and performed all that was possible in the making and subscribing of
an oath as a member of the House of Commons, yet because he had no
fear of "future punishments," the court held that he had made no oath
and was incapable of making one. 10 He was prosecuted and penalized
'Hronek v. People, 134 Ill. 139, 24 N. E. 861, 23 A. S. R. 652, 8 L. R. A. 837:
Perry's Case, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 632: Bush v. Com., 80 Ky. 244: People v. Copsey, 71
Cal. 548, 12 Pac. 721; McClellan v. Owens (Mo.), 74 S. W. 2d 570, 95 A. L. R.
724, and note.
'Sec.
1, Ch. 177, C. S. A.
8
Sec. 7, Ch. 177, C. S. A.
9
Com. v. Oldham, 1 Dana (Ky.) 466.
"Attorney General v. Bradlaugh, 14 Q. B. D. (1885) 667. Same reasoning in
Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362 (1841).
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for having voted without first having made and subscribed the oath required of a member of Parliament.
By way of dictum an Illinois court said that one incompetent as a

witness "may take official oaths, and make ex parte affidavits,"" because
there is no one who can object to competency. There could, however,
be an objecting party if the affidavit is made in the course of an adversary
proceeding. Moreover, if Bradlaugh's case is still the law, it is possible
for the officer who administers oaths to refuse to administer it to a person not believing in "future punishments," or if the oath is administered, then the public official to whom the affidavit is presented may
refuse to recognize it as such. Under the reasoning of Bradlaugh's case,
there is a vacancy in any public office where the incumbent, at the time
he took the oath of office, concurred in Bradlaugh's opinions and was,
therefore, incapable of taking an oath according to the common law.
He could not even verify a pleading.
It has been held that an "infamous" person may make an affidavit,
because to hold otherwise would be "a denial of justice.'

2

But judges

were not so considerate of persons, not "infamous" but having opinions
differing from their.own. The expressions "utter want of moral sensibility,"' 2 and "grossest moral depravity,'

14

were used against such per-

sons. A complainant from whom goods were stolen was not permitted
to testify against the thief because he, the victim, believed God and Nature to be equivalents.1 5 A child criminally assaulted was held incompetent to testify because she did not understand, and therefore did not
While nearly all the
profess, the doctrine of "future punishments." '
case law in point deals with witnesses in 1a7 court room, it was recognized
that the same rules apply also to affiants.
.Litigants desire to use as witnesses those who know the facts.
Hence, constitutional and statutory provisions liberate all prospective
witnesses. But most affiants swear only for their own purposes, and for
this reason may have been overlooked when new written law was made.
They are plainly omitted in the clause of the Iowa, Minnesota, Texas
and Wisconsin constitutions, which provide that "no person shall be
* * * rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity,
in consequence of his opinions on the subject of religion." In Wyoming
the clause uses the words "serve as a witness,' ' 1 which would exclude an
affiant.
"The Central, etc. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 11. 541, 554 (1856).
"Ritter v. Stutts, 8 Ired. (N. C.) 240 (1852).
'Odell v. Koppee, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 88 (1871).
"Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 265 (1859).
'U.
S. v. Lee, Fed. Cas. No. 15,586.
8
Beason v. State, 72 Ala. 191 (1882).
7
Leonard v. Manard, I N. Y. Super. (1 Hall's Rep.) 200 (1828).
"Sec. 18, Art. I, providing "* * * no person shall be rendered incompetent to
* * serve as a witness or juror, because of his opinion on any matter of religious
belief whatever; * * *-
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It is popularly supposed that anyone may make an "affirmation."
If so, still an invalid oath could not be converted into a valid affirmation.
But a person not fearing supernatural punishments is as much disqualified to make an affirmation as he is to take an oath. 19 That is the case
law. Our statute permits affirmations only where the "person shall have
conscientious scruples against taking the oath." 26 This was modeled
after such foreign statutes as had the intent not to relax the rule requiring fear of "future punishments," but to accommodate Quakers, Nicolites, Tunkers and Mennonists 2 1 or "Quakers and the like, ' '2 2 who believe
that the divine command is to "Swear not at all." Only in Florida
does the statute clearly permit affirmations by "all persons who do not
believe in the doctrine of future rewards and punishments" 2 3 In England the whole situation was remedied, possibly as the result of Bradlaugh's case,2 4 by a statute which provided that "every person * * *
stating * * * that he has no religious belief, * * * shall be permitted to
make his solemn affirmation * * * in all places and for all purposes
where an oath is or shall be required by law, * * *"25
Civil Procedure Rule 43 (d) permits "a solemn affirmation" in any
proceeding under the rule. The implications of the word "solemn" are
conflicting, but since it was also used in the English statute, affecting
persons with "no religious belief," it can be so applied here. But there
is found judicial expression which would support the thesis that a person
not fearing hell is legally incapable of making either oath or affirmation
before a Justice of the Peace, or as part of an affidavit in connection with
an initiative and referendum petition. In other words, there are many
situations where a public official may ignore an affidavit, as if it did not
exist, just as the prosecutors of Charles Bradlaugh regarded his written
oath as no oath at all, if the common law applied against him is the
common law existing here and was not abrogated by Section 4 of our
Bill of Rights. Our local courts have not yet declared whether they
agree with the Illinois opinion, 2 which would free all affiants from molestation, thus giving vitality to the Bill of Rights, or with the judicial
waif in Ohio,2 7 which would continue the common law disability based
on private opinions on theological matters.
"Leonard v. Manard, supra, note 17.
'Sec. 2, Ch. 115, C. S.A. 1935.
'Ch. 71, sec. 3. Compl. Sts. D. C. 1894.
'Samford, J., in Wright v. State, 24 Ala. App. 378, 135 So. 636, 640 (1931).
'R. S. 1919, Sec. 2703, as quoted in 3 Wigmore on Ev. (2d ed.) 880.
Supra, note-le.

'51-52 Vict., Ch. 46, Sec. 1, quoted 3 Wigmore on Ev. (2d ed.) 877.
'Hronek v. People, supra, note 6.
'Clinton v. The State, supra, note 5, cited by annotator of Sec. 89-1701 R. S.
Wyo. 1931 as if still applicable in Wyoming.

The Possibihfty of
Reverter in Colorado
By CHARLES MELVIN NEFF*
(Continued from May Issue)
There was a strong dissenting opinion filed in this case by the Chief
Justice, Mr. Marshall. A splendid review of the case by Louis H. Rubin
may be found in 9 Boston University Law Review, p. 29 1.
It will be noted in this Ohio case that the court decided there was
no possibility of reverter and that the title to the lot, and buildings
thereon appurtenant thereto, remained in the grantees, the trustees of the
church, although the land was no longer used for church purposes. In
contrast to this case is another Ohio case-the Board of Education V.
Hollingsworth (1936), 56 Ohio Appellate Reports 95, in which the
habendum clause did contain the phrase "and no longer." In that case
the, same court decided that the title to the property upon the disuse of
the purposes for which it was granted became reinvested in the grantor.
It will also be noted in this latter case that the deed contained no provision for reversion nor did it preserve unto the grantor a right of re-entry.
The facts and decision of the Hollingsworth case are as follows:
Where the Habendum Clause Contains the Words "And No
Longer": In 1936, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in the case of Board of
Education v. Hollingsworth, 56 Ohio Appellate Reports 95, decided
that a deed conveying to a Board of Education a small lot of ground
and containing a clause, "To have and to hold * * * so long as the same
shall be occupied as a site for a schoolhouse and no longer," clearly expresses an intention on the part of the grantor to provide for a reverter
and forfeiture and conveys a tenure limited to the continued use for
school purposes.
The facts were that the Board of Education filed an action to quiet
title to a small lot of ground which had for many years been used by it
for school purposes. Some four years previous to the filing of this action
such use had been discontinued, the Board of Education, by appropriate
resolution, found that the lot was no longer needed for such purposes
and thereupon the lot was ordered sold.
At the sale Hollingsworth bid for the premises, and the same were
sold to him. He paid $25.00 on the purchase price, but later took the
position that the Board of Education did not have any title to the premises in question which it could convey, and, therefore, that he was not
bound by his bid, but was, on the contrary, entitled to the refund of his
deposit. He filed an answer to this effect, and alleged therein that he had
acquired title from the heirs of one of the original grantors of the land
*Of the Denver Bar.
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and prayed that title to the premises be decreed in him. The lower court
sustained Hollingsworth and the Board of Education thereupon appealed. This Appellate Court took the position that the judgment of
the lower court in favor of Hollingsworth should be affirmed. The
Appellate Court held, in sustaining the lower court, that the deed conveyed not an absolute fee to the Board of Education, but merely a tenure
limited to the continued use for school purposes. The Appellate Court
in its opinion said:
"The question is considered in the cases of In Re Matter of
Copps Chapel M. E. Church, 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N. E. 218;
Schwing v. McClure et al., Trustees, 120 Ohio St. 335, 166 N. E.
230; Licking County AgriculturalSociety v. County Commissioners, 48 Ohio App. 528, 194 N. E. 606; Schurch v. Harrirnan, 47
Ohio App. 383, 191 N. E. 907. See also: 13 Ohio Jurisprudence
961 ; 16 Ohio Jurisprudence 394, 396.
"In the Church case the court distinguishes lessee of Sperry
v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387, in which the language used was much the
same as that employed in the instant case, in that the following
expression appears in the deed: 'so long as they should continue
to use and improve the 'same for the express purpose of grinding,
and no longer.' In the Pond case the language used was held sufficient to express the intention of reverter and forfeiture.
"In the Church case similar words, omitting the words 'no
longer,' were held not to express such intent. The question, as in
in wills, is what was the intention of the one who executed the
instrument, as such intention is gained from the words used?
While we agree with Judge Marshall in his dissenting opinion, that
the words 'no longer' add nothing to the strength of the words
used to express a reverter, we feel justified in adopting the same
line of demarcation used by the Supreme Court in distinguishing
the Pond case from the Church case, and in concluding that the
language used in the instant case clearly expressed an intention on
the part of the original grantor to provide for a reverter and forfeiture.
'We are strengthened in our view of the law by the conclusion of the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law
of Property. We quote from Tentative Draft No. 2, pages 21, 22:
"Section 54. Language sufficient to create an estate in determinable fee simple.
"An estate in determinable fee simple is created by any limitation which, in an otherwise effective conveyance of land:
"(a)
Is effective to create an estate in fee simple, and
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"(b)

Effectively provides that upon the happening of a
stated event the estate shall automatically terminate in
favor either of the conveyor or of his successor in interest."

In the first of these two Ohio cases the clause was considered to be
merely declaratory of the purpose for which the land was conveyed, and
the recital was not held to have the effect of limiting the estate granted or
rendering it liable to divestiture upon departure from the use specified.
In the second Ohio case the habendum clause limited the purpose
and granted an estate for such time as it was so used and no longer. This
specified condition created a determinable or qualified fee, subject to termination and reversion upon cessation of that use. It was the intention
and purpose implied that the title should revert to the grantor upon a
failure to use the land for a school.
In neither of the two above-mentioned Ohio cases did the deed of
conveyance contain a provision of reverter, or retain in behalf of the
grantor a right of re-entry. It was otherwise in the earliest Colorado
case, Cowell v. Colorado Springs (1876), 3 Colorado 82, affirmed, on
appeal, in 100 U. S. 50. There land was conveyed by a deed; granting
an estate in fee and containing the following condition:
"Witnesseth, that the said party of the first part, for and in
consideration of the sum of $250.00, to it in hand paid by the said
party of the second part, and also for the further consideration of
the agreements between the parties hereto, for themselves, their
heirs, successors, and legal representatives, that intoxicating liquors
shall never be manufactured, sold or otherwise disposed of as a
beverage in any place of public resort, in or upon the premises
hereby granted, or any part thereof; and it is herein and hereby
expressly reserved by the said party of the first part, that in case
any of the above conditions concerning intoxicating liquors are
broken by the said party of the second part, his assigns or legal
representatives, then this deed shall become null and void, and all
right, title and interest of, in, and to the premises hereby conveyed
shall revert to the said party of the first part, its successors and
assigns, and the said party of the second part by accepting this deed
for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, consents and agrees to the reservations and conditions aforesaid."
Evidence was given tending to show that after the execution and
delivery of the deed, the grantee had sold and disposed of intoxicating
liquors as a beverage, in a place of public resort' upon the premises
granted.
The court held that the condition was valid, binding upon the
grantee and was not repugnant to the estate granted, and that, as the
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condition was broken, the grantor might at once maintain ejectment,
without previous entry, demand or notice.
The United States Supreme Court, in 1876, affirmed the judgment
in 110 U. S., p. 55, the court in its opinion, speaking through Mr.
Justice Field, saying:
"The principal questions, therefore, for our determination
are the validity of the condition, and, on its breach, the right of the
plaintiff to maintain the action without previous entry or demand
of possession.
"The validity of the condition is assailed by the defendant as
repugnant to the estate conveyed. His contention is, that as the
granting words of the deed purport to transfer the land, and the
entire interest of the company therein, he took the property in absolute ownership, with liberty to use it in any lawful manner which
he might choose. With such use the condition is inconsistent, and
he therefore insists that it is repugnant to the estate granted. But
the answer is, that the owner of property has a right to dispose of
it with a limited restriction on its use, however much the restriction
may affect the value or the nature of the estate. Repugnant conditions are those which tend to the utter subversion of the estate, such
as prohibit entirely the alienation or use of the property. Conditions which prohibit its alienation to particular persons or for a
limited period, or its subjection to particular uses, are not subversive
of the estate: they do not destroy or limit its alienable or inheritable
character. Sheppard's Touchstone 129, 131. The reports are full
of cases where conditions imposing restrictions upon the uses to
which property conveyed in fee may be subjected have been upheld.
In this way slaughter-houses, soap factories, distilleries, livery stables, tanneries, and machine shops have, in a multitude of instances,
been excluded from particular localities, which, thus freed from
unpleasant sights, noxious vapors, or disturbing noises, have become desirable as places for residences of families. To hold that
conditions for their exclusion from premises conveyed are inoperative, would defeat numerous arrangements in our large cities for the
health and comfort of whole neighborhoods.
"The condition in the deed of the plaintiff against the manufacture or the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage at any place
of public resort on the premises, was not subversive of the estate
conveyed. It left the estate alienable and inheritable, and free to
be subjected to other uses. 'It was not unlawful nor against public
policy, but, on the contrary, it was imposed in the interest of public
health and morality.
"A condition in a deed, not materially different from that
under consideration here, was held valid and not repugnant to the
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grant by the Court of Appeals of New York in Plumb v. Tubbs,
41 N. Y. 442. And a similar condition was held by the Supreme
Court of Kansas to be a valid condition subsequent, upon the continued observance of which the estate conveyed depended. 14 Kan.
61. See also Doe v. Keeling, 1 Mau. & Sel. 95, and Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 283.
"We have no doubt that the condition in the deed to the defendant here is valid and not repugnant to the estate conveyed. It
is a condition subsequent, and upon its breach the company had
a right to treat the estate as having reverted to it, and bring ejectment for the premises. A previous entry upon the premises, or a
demand for their possession, was not necessary. By statute in
Colorado it is sufficient for the plaintiff in ejectment to show a right
to the possession of the demanded premises at the commencement
of the action as heir, devisee, purchaser, or otherwise. The commencement of the action there stands in lieu of entry and demand
of possession. See also Austin v. Cambridgeport Parish, 21 Pick.
(Mass.) 215; Cornelius v. Ivins, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 376; Ruch v.
Rock Island, 97 U. S. 693."

It will be noted that in the first Ohio case, the Copps Chapel case,
the court adjudged the title to be vested completely in the grantee, and
that no right at all remained in the grantor, not even a possibility of
reverter in case of condition broken. Without doubt a prospective purchaser of the church lot could have obtained from the trustees a marketable title in fee simple absorute.
But, in cases like the second Ohio case-the Board of Educationand the Colorado case of Cowell, Colorado Springs, upon condition the
broken title, immediately leaves the grantee and reinvests in the grantor.
Nothing need be done by the grantor. The grantee has no title to sell.
The grantor has a marketable title in fee simple absolute to sell, and if
he is denied possession he may, as stated in the Colorado case, "at once
maintain ejectment, without previous entry, demand or notice." and we
may note here, as stated above, section 54, subsection (b) , of the Restatement of the Law of Property that "upon the happening of a stated
event the estate shall automatically (italics supplied) , terminate in favor
of the conveyor or of his successor in interest."
Other Colorado cases on this subject are B. and Colorado R. R. Co,
v. ColoradoE.R. R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88 Pac. 154; and Board
of Commissioners of El Paso County, et al. v. City of Colorado Springs
(1919), 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301; D. & S. Fe Ry. Co. v. School
District (1890), 14 Colo. 327, 23 Pac. 978.
The right of possibility of reuerter contrasted with the right of
re-entry: There is a practical and a material difference between that
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state of the title where the grantor has only a mere possibility of reverter,
and where, on the other hand, he holds a right of entry for condition
broken. Attorney General u. Merrimack Mfg. Co. (1860), 14 Gray
586, 80 Mass. 586. Some courts seem to lose sight of the distinction
between the right to re-enter founded upon a condition subsequent, and
the right of possibility of reverter which, as stated in Burlington & C.
R. Co. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88 Pac. 154,
is founded upon a limitation.
Thus the court in the case of Sioux City & St. Paul R. Co. v. Singer
(1892), Minn., 15 L. R. A. 751, at 753, declares that where there is a
conveyance of an estate in fee with the express condition that intoxicating
liquor should not be sold and the conveyance is recorded, then the successive purchasers bought with constructive notice of it. And the court
allowed an action of ejectment. ''If," said the court, "by reason of the
breach of the condition subsequent, the plaintiff had a right to re-enter,
it was not necessary that the common law ceremony of a re-entry be performed, as a condition precedent to the prosecution of an action to recover the possession of the property," citing among other cases, Ruch V.
Rock Island (1878), 97 U. S. 693.
It will be noticed that the court, loose in its language, used the
words "condition subsequent," when it really considered the prohibition
against liquor selling as a limitation, and allowed ejectment, and not a
condition subsequent, which would necessitate action of re-entry. In
this connection the most exact language, expressing the distinction between the condition subsequent and the conditional limitation, used by
Mr. Justice Bigelow in Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square V.
Grant and Others, supra, may be noticed. This distinction is also emphasized and applied in the Colorado case of B. & Colorado R. R. Co.
v. ColoradoE.R. R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, supra, 88 Pac. 154.
Mr. Justice Bigelow on this distinction said in part (pp. 146-149)
"Strictly speaking, and using words in their precise legal import, the devise in question does not create simply an estate on condition. By the common law, a condition annexed to real estate
could be reserved only to the grantor or devisor, -and his heirs.
Upon a breach of the condition, the estate of the grantee or devisee
was not ipso facto terminated, but the law permitted it to continue
beyond the time when the contingency upon which it was given or
granted happened, and until an entry or claim was made by the
grantor or his heirs, or the heirs of the devisor, who alone had the
right to take advantage of a breach. 21 Bl. Com. 156. 4 Kent
Com. (6th ed.) 122, 127. Hence arose the distinction between a
condition and a conditional limitation. A condition, followed by
a limitation over to a third person in case the condition be not fulfilled, or there be a breach of it, is termed a conditional limitation.
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A condition determines an estate after breach upon entry or claim
by the grantor or his heirs, or the heirs of the devisor. A limitation
marks the period which determines the estate, without any act on
the part of him who has the next expectant interest. Upon the
happening of the prescribed contingency, the estate first limited
comes at once to an end, and the subsequent estate arises. If it
.were otherwise, it would be in the power of the heir to defeat the
limitation over, by neglecting or refusing to enter for breach of the
condition. This distinction was originally introduced, in the case
of wills, to get rid of the embarrassment arising from the rule of
the ancient common law, that an estate could not be limited to a
stranger, upon an event which went to abridge or destroy an estate
previously limited. A conditional limitation is therefore of a mixed
nature, partaking both of a condition and of a limitation; of a

condition, because it defeats the estate previously limited; and of a
limitation, because, upon the happening of the contingency, the
estate passes to the person having the next expectant interest, without entry or claim.
"There is a further distinction in the nature of estates on
condition, and those created by conditional limitation, which it
may be material to notice. Where an estate in fee is created on condition, the enter interest does not pass out of the grantor by the
same instrument or conveyance. All that remains, after the gift
or-grant takes effect, continues in the grafitor, and goes to his heirs.
This is the right of entry, as we have already seen, which, from the
nature of the grant, is reserved to the grantor and his heirs only,
and which gives them the right to enter as of their old estate, upon
the breach of the condition. This possibility of reverter, as it is
termed, arises in the grantor or devisor immediately on the creation
of the conditional estate. It is otherwise where the estate in fee is
limited over to a third persori in case of a breach of the condition.
Then the entire estate, by the same instrument, passes out of the
grantor or devisor. The first estate vests immediately, but the
expectant interest does not take effect until the happening of the
contingency upon which it was limited to arise. But both owe
their existence to the same grant or gift; they are created uno flatu;
and being an ultimate disposition of the entire fee, as well after as
before the breach of the condition, there is nothing left in the
grantor or devisor or his heirs. The right or possibility of reverter,
which, on the creation of an estate in fee on condition merely,
would remain in him, is given over by the limitation which is to
take effect on the breach of the condition.
"One material difference therefore, between an estate in fee on
condition and one on a conditional limitation, is briefly this: that
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the former leaves in the grantor a vested right, which, by its very
nature, is reserved to him, as a present existing interest, transmissible to his heirs; while the latter passes the whole interest of the
grantor at once, and creates an estate to arise and vest in a third
person, upon a contingency, at a future and uncertain period of
time. A grant of a fee on condition only creates an estate of a base
or determinable nature in the grantee, leaving the right or possibility of reverter vested in the grantor. Such an interest or right
in the grantor, as it does not arise and take effect upon a future
uncertain or remote contingency, is not liable to the objection of
violating the rule against perpetuities, in the same degree with other
conditional and contingent interests in real estate of an executory
character. The possibility of reverter, being a vested interest in
real property, is capable at all times of being released to the person
holding the estate on condition, or his grantee, and, if so .released,
vests an absolute and indefeasible 'title thereto. The grant or devise
of a fee on condition does not therefore fetter and tie up estates, so
as to prevent their alienation, and thus contravene the policy of the
law which aims to secure the free and unembarrassed disposition of
real property. It is otherwise with gifts or grants of estates in fee,
with limitations over upon a condition or event of an uncertain or
indeterminate nature. The limitation over being executory, and
depending on a condition, or an event which may never happen,
passes no vested interest or estate. It is impossible to ascertain in
whom the ultimate right to the estate may vest, or whether it will
ever vest at all, and therefore no conveyance or mode of alienation
can pass an absolute title, because it is wholly uncertain in whom
the estate will vest on the happening in the event or breach of the
condition upon which the ulterior gift is to take effect."

In the latter case the court further said: "The distinction between
an estate upon condition and the limitation by which an estate is determined upon the happening of some event, that in the latter case the
estate reverts to the grantor, or passes to the person to whom it is granted
by limitation over, upon the mere happening of the event upon which it
is limited, without entry or other act; while in the former the reservation
can only be made to the grantor or his heirs, and an entry upon breach
of the condition is requisite to revest the estate. The provision for reentry is therefore the distinctive characteristic of an estate upon conditional and when it is found that by any form of expression the grantor
has reserved the right upon the happening of any event, to re-enter, and
thereby revest in himself his former estate, it may be construed as such.
Shep. Touch. 121, 122, Lit. Secs. 329, 330, 4 Cruise Dig. Title 32, c.

25, 4 Kent Com. (6th Ed.) 125, 126. The words 'provided,' 'so that,'
and 'upon condition that' are the usual words to make a condition; but
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to say that if a certain event happen the grantor may re-enter is equally
effectual. And the reason of this rule of construction is, that the stipulation for a right of re-entry would be senseless if the deed were to be
construed to create a limitation; because the estate vesting upon the mere
happening of the event, the right to enter would of course follow with
all other rights of ownership."
(Continued in July Issue)
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Children of the
Half Blood
By J.H. THOMAS*
The second subdivision of Section 1, Chapter 176 of the C. S. A.
1935, covers a situation where an intestate leaves no heirs in either the
ascending or descending lines of inheritance. In that case it provides:
"* * * then to the brothers and sisters, and the descendants of the
brothers and sisters who are dead, the descendants, collectively, taking the share of their immediate ancestor, in equal parts."
The foregoing provision does not expressly state that the half blood
brothers and sisters shall inherit in such a case. Neither does it say they
shall not inherit. It expressly provides that the children (descendants)
of brothers and sisters shall inherit, but here, again, it fails to say whether
children only of the full bloods shall take, or whether the right of inheritance shall extend also to the children of the half blood brothers and
sisters who are dead. So, with nothing but the above section as a guide,
only doubt and uncertainty would prevail in a case where an intestate
without heirs in the ascending or descending lines of inhertance? might
leave brothers and sisters, half brothers and half sisters; or where children of deceased half brothers or half sisters might survive the intestate.
Due to some doubt as to just what the rule of the common law
might be, and the extent of its application in a given locality, legislature,
in some of the states, including Colorado, enacted what, in substance,
was our Section 4 of Chapter 176 C. S. A., which in part read:
"Children and descendants of children of the half blood shall
inherit the same as children and descendants of the whole blood,
but collateral relatives of the half blood shall inherit only the half
measure of collateral relatives of the whole blood, if there be any
of the last named class living. * * *"
If Subdivision 2 of Section 1, Chapter 176, left doubt as to intestate's half brothers' and half sisters' rights, and the rights of the children
of such half bloods, it was remoed by Section 4. But the rights of
these half bloods, and the "children of such half bloods" were reduced
in quantity to one half the share of a whole blood, but only in the event
a whole blood lived to furnish the yardstick.
When Section 4 says, "Children of the half blood shall inherit the
same as those of the whole blood," it simply means that the children,
whether of the half or whole blood, collectively take the share of their
immediate ancestor. The share of that ancestor (if a half blood) is
fixed at half a share, if a whole blood still lives.
Whatever influence the common law may have had on descents and
distributions in the past, our Supreme Court has said that we must look
to these statutes. Wilson v. Wilson, 95 Colo. 159.
*Of Antonito.
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The Colorado Legislature (1941) struck out of Section 4 that
part which provided that the half blood's children might inherit, but
left the portion which says that collaterals of the half blood shall take
only half as much as full bloods if any full bloods live to take. The
proponents of the change contended that,
"There are no such things as children
and descendants of
children of the half blood."
Certainly a child cannot be related to its mother, or to one standing
above it in the ancestral line, or below it in the descending line, by the
half blood. But. there is nothing to prevent it from being the child of
a half blood brother or sister of an intestate who has died and left a
fortune.
Bouvier defines "half blood" as
"A term denoting a degree of relationship which exists between those who have one parent only in common."
"The half blood" is an expression commonly used by commentators to express a relationship between an intestate and his collateral relatives. " It could have no meaning in ascending or descending lines of
consanguinity, and is never so used.
"Children of the half sister, children of the half brother, children
of the half blood, the half blood's children, "---4s what the old statute
was trying to say when it was decapitated.
A private in the Marine Corps was killed on July 18, 1918, and
had a war risk policy. His old father was beneficiary, but lived only a
short time after his son's death. The son never married, and had no
relatives in the ascending or descending lines after his father's death.
The Act of Congress required distribution to the soldier's heirs as determined by his place of residence (Colorado).
The soldier had half brothers, half sisters, full brothers and full
sisters. Some of each class were living, and some were dead. There
were living full brothers and sisters, each of whom took two shares.
There was at least one half brother living who took one share, or one
half measure of the full blood. There were little families of children
of deceased half bloods, each of which families, collectively, took one
share; and there were families of children of deceased whole bloods, and
each such family, collectively, took two shares. This was in strict compliance with Section 4.
aBearing in mind that we must look to statute law for our guide,
and considering the form and substance of the section as amended, I
believe that children of an intestate's half blood brother or sister cannot
take. Whether the half blood can take might be open to an argument.
But there is no argument at all as to the amendment having been inadvertently enacted without the slightest intention on the part of the legislature to disinherit any class of persons.
I believe the substance of the old section should be reenacted. It is
possible that its meaning might be made a little more obvious.

Current Tax Problems
Discussed by ALBERT J. GOULD

The Maass Decision
The Supreme Court, in the above case, decided in the first week of
March, 1941, held that income during the year of administration is not
to be included in the gross estate for the purpose of Federal estate tax
when the executor or administrator elects to base the valuation of the
estate upon the actual market value thereof one year from the date of
death.
This decision constitutes one of the few Supreme Court decisions
in favor of the taxpayer in the last fifteen months, and, no doubt, will
be followed by the Colorado Income Tax Department.
Refund claims will be in order for most estates heretofore subject
to Federal taxation.

Gift of Life Insurance Policy
The decisions which have held that the cash surrender value is the
basis for gift tax purposes where a life insiurance policy is donated
apparently will be overruled eventually, in view of l'ater decisions to the
effect that the cost basis of the policy is the cost basis for gift tax purposes.
The latest decision is Phipps, 43 B. T. A. No. 112, which held
that the premium cost to date of gift and not the cash surrender value
is the cost basis for the purpose of determining gift taxes.

Trust Income
The Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365, PaTdee, 290 U. S. 365, and
Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148, leading decisions present varying phases of
the problems involved as to taxation of income of a trust to the trustee
or to the beneficiary, depending upon the terms of* the trust and the
vested or other right of the beneficiary to income.
In Mallory, 44 B. T. A. No. 45, recently decided, the Board held
that the income should be taxed to the trust as to the amount thereof
retained by the trust and to the widow as to the amount thereof distributed to her. The trust agreement provided that the income should be
distributed to the widow in the discretion of the trustees when they
thought it "wise and provident" and principal also could be distributed
to the beneficiaries.
Persons interested in the above problem as to taxation of income
to the trust or the beneficiary should read the above cases and the Gavit
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case, 268 U. S. 161, and particularly the Freuler case, 291 U. S. 35, and
the Dean case, 102 Fed. 699 (10th Circ.).
Great caution must be exercised in relying upon the above decisions
and all cases citing the above decisions must be studied carefully to ascertain their correct application to the factual situation at hand.
In the writer's opinion, the Mallory decision probably will be
reversed.

Attorney's Fees
The Supreme Court of the United States, on April 28, '1941, in
Pyne v. Commissioner, disallowed a deduction of attorney's fees from
income of a very large estate and in Duke Trust v. Commissioner, disallowed trustee's commissions from income of a trust, holding that the
estate and the trust were not engaged in business, and, therefore, that
said attorney's fees and trustee's commissions were not "business expenses."
These cases radically affect prior rules and decisions and should be
studied. See IT 2751, IT 2579, and OD 877.

Loss Deductions
In Robert S. Fairall, 44 B. T. A. No. 43, a director was permitted
to take the full loss involved in payment by him of a large sum to obtain
a release of his personal liability resulting from a breach of his duty as a
director, in approving the declaration and payment of a dividend in violation of state law.

Fire Insurance Proceeds
In-Helvering v. 'illiam Flaccus Oak Leather Co., decided April
28, 1941, the Supreme Court decided that gain or loss resulting from
fire insurance proceeds is accountable in full, upon the theory that the
receipt of such proceeds is not "a sale or exchange," and, therefore, that
said gain or loss is not subject to capital asset percentages.

Local Bar Association Elects Officers
The newly created Continental Divide Bar Association selected
William J. Meehan of Eagle for president, Carl Kaiser of Breckenridge
for vice-president, and J. Corder Smith of Leadville for secretary-treasurer.
At the annual meeting of the San Luis Valley Bar Association held
on May 12th, Charles R. Corlett of Monte Vista was elected president,
Raphael J. Moses of Alamosa, vice-president, and Ralph C. Ellithorpe
of Del Norte secretary-treasurer of the San Luis Valley Bar Association
for the ensuing year.

Hemispherical Cooperation
Is Theme of Inter-American
Bar Association Meeting
By WILLIAM R. EATON*
When a traveler asks any person in a South American or any other
country-even in our own city-whether he, his townsmen, or the
inhabitants of his country would rather have a dollar or a dime, the
answer will be almost unanimous for the larger rather than the smaller
portion, and this applies whether the subject is a quantity of money
beef, sugar, or any commodity.
However, if the person questioned and the other citizens of his
country are asked whether they will use every effort to cooperate in a
great common cause, even at the expense of some part of the dollars or
articles of commerce involved, the practically unanimous answer will be
found to be one for cooperation.
This was illustrated at the recent meeting of the Inter-American
Bar Association at Havana, where lawyers from Argentina, Brazil, Cuba,
the United States, and practically every country of the western hemisphere met to discuss questions of international and comparative law.
The Judge Advocate General of the United States Army, Major
General Allen W. Gullion, the Assistant to the Legal Adviser of the
Secretary of State, William Roy Vallance, and lawyers holding similar
confidential offices in the governments of most of the countries in the
western hemisphere, as well as the President of the American Bar Association, Jacob M. Lashly, and lawyers representing the most important
legal, commercial and humanitarian interests, actively participated in the
meetings.
The conference was opened by a message brimful of cooperative
suggestions and opinions by governmental adviser Dr. Enrique Gil, one
of the most outstanding lawyers of Argentina, and was closed by inspiring and instructive speeches of cooperation by Attorney General Hon.
Robert H. Jackson, of the United States, and Minister of Justice Hon.
Victor Vega, of Cuba.
The predominant themes were the effect of the European conflict
on the relationships of the countries of the western hemisphere, the role
of the lawyer in the defense of the Americas, a program for western
hemisphere cooperation and defense, inter-continental brotherhood, and
*Delegate from the Colorado Bar Association and American Bar Association to
the meeting of the Inter-American Bar Association in Havana, Cuba, March 24-28,
1941.
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the promotion of harmony between the peoples of North, Central and
South America.
Whether Argentine or United States beef, Cuban cane or Colorado
beet sugar, or Brazilian or Guatemalan coffee, should have special consideration in the commercial, competitive or diplomatic fields, and the conduct of North American merchants toward those of South America became comparatively unimportant subjects, in which this conference
differed from the news reports of previous Pan American conferences.
There was a general understanding that the present situation in world
affairs requires cooperation in matters and things which compel commercial supremacies to take second place, at least for the present.
No matter what particular controversies might have been voiced,
after the discussions there was not merely a unanimous expression of the
results as set forth in the resolutions, but there were as sincere personal
expressions of cooperation and good will as it is possible for men to
make.

To mention specifically the subjects discussed or the resolutions
adopted would take too long. The activities of each government in
respect to the vessels and airships of each other and European countries,
whether in or out of the present war, the handling of munitions of war,
contraband and lawful cargoes, the status to be understood by the terms
"neutrals," "non-belligerents" and "belligerents," and the other statements of the representatives of the governments of each nation, were all
finally resolved into and showed a full realization of the old maxim that
"if we do not hang together, we will hang separately." In fact, this
maxim, when delivered by one of the speakers in Spanish, obtained the
most vociferous applause and continued comment of the entire conference.
A most interesting feature of the conference was the use of translators--electrical devices connected with ear-phones. Each word was
translated and spoken simultaneously in English, Spanish, Portuguese,
and French. One had only to turn the dial on his translator to test his
understanding of any of the four languages. Or, if he wished, he
could take one ear-phone away from one ear and listen with that ear to
the speaker delivering his address in Spanish or another language, and at
the same time, with his other ear, hear the exact translation thereof in
perfect English.
From every standpoint, the conference was a great success. Each
representative went back to his own country with a firm conviction that
a great good had.been accomplished, and that a basis had been made for a
better understanding between those who must advise the representatives
of their governments and commercial interests, which would have far
reaching benefits.
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Application for Change of Venue Brings Interesting
Ruling from Judge in Murder Case
On April 10, 1940, five people were killed on the Gunbarrel road
south of Monte Vista, and as a result thereof, the state filed informations
against Patricio Maez in the District Court of Conejos County for the
deaths of three of these persons.
The wife and son of Maez were killed by a deputy sheriff, Martinez. Maez then killed Martinez, Dominquez and Ortega, and no eye
witness of the tragedy remained except Maez.
The story as told by Maez, substantiated throughout by police
officers, is as follows:
He, his wife and son, riding in their truck, were stopped by Ortega,
Dominquez and Martinez at an intersection of the road. All three got
out of the truck and walked about fifty feet to face the deputy sheriff.
A short conversation took place. Then Martinez either accidentally or wantonly shot the wife and son of Maez. Maez then turned
and ran for his truck with Dominquez following him. Securing a rifle
he shot Dominquez, then Martinez, and finally Ortega, whom he afterwards beat over the head with the barrel of the rifle.
Affidavits for change of venue were presented to the court before
trial, alleging prejudice of the inhabitants of Conejos County, and were
overruled by the court.
The case was tried in Conejos County and Maez acquitted of the
killing of Martinez, and convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the
killing of Dominquez and Ortega.
Motion for a new trial was filed, and of interest to the bar are the
statements of Honorable John I. Palmer, judge of the Twelfth Judicial
District, in regard to the motion for new trial, as follows:
The Court: (After hearing argument of counsel on motion for
new trial).
When one considers what was offered in support of the application
for change of venue, I think any lawyer would come to the conclusion
that the showing was not sufficient to warrant any other ruling than the
overruling of the application at that time. That application was based
largely upon the prejudice of the people of Conejos County toward the
defendant. But one who took part in the trial and particularly one who
occupies the position that the court occupied during that trial was bound
to be struck, impressed, and very much disturbed by that imponderable,
intangible atmosphere that existed here throughout the trial. Prejudice
of an audience and its influence upon the court on the trial is, as I have
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described it, imponderable, intangible almost always. It doesn't manifest itself in overt acts and crude attempts to influence the action of the
jury, but it is something that is in the atmosphere; something that shows
itself that you can't put your hand on. You can't point at this or that
and say here it is. You feel it. You sense it. And I feel that I would
be doing less than my duty as one who tries to be a fair judge in matters
of this sort if I refrained from pointing out in my forty years of experience in the trial of cases I never have seen so startling a manifestation of
the existence, and I sometimes fear the effect of that prejudice, that we
are always seeking to guard against. The fact that it is imponderable
and intangible makes it hard to demonstrate. And the fact that it is
difficult to bring forward positive evidence of the existence of a psychological state might explain the absence of those things which are technically required which you put in the written record as the reason for calling for the sustaining of the motion which is presently made. Ever
since the trial I have studied for hours trying to satisfy my conscience in
the matter without finding as yet a solution, without finding as yet that
which would warrant action either way and leave one's conscience entirely clear that he had done the right thing after all. That is what
counts.
The defendant was convicted in two of three cases of voluntary
manslaughter. In order that you may understand what is in the court's
mind, and in order that you may be able to realize something of the
difficulty that this question presents (much more difficult than any other
similar question that has ever come to my attention), I want to read
from the instructions that were given-that are always given in a case
of this sort-a couple of paragraphs of definitions.
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being,
without malice, express or implied, and without any mixture of
deliberation whatever. It must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat
of passion caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make
the passion irresistible, or involuntary, in the commission of an
unlawful act, or a lawful act without due caution or circumspection.
"In cases of voluntary manslaughter there must be a serious
and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an
attempt by the person killed to commit a serious injury on the
person killing.
"The killing must be the result of that sudden violent impulse
of passion supposed to be irresistible; for if there should appear to
have been an interval between the assault or provocation given and
the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be
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heard, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and punished as murder."

Apply that definition to the evidence, even to the defendant's story,
and this question is difficult to answer: does not that definition fit exactly
what happened? That story is that he saw his wife and his son shot
down by Martinez, who came there in company with the other two men.
According to .the story, shot down without any reason or purpose that
appears. That was an injury to this defendant; that was such an injury
that would excite in the mind of anybody, of course, an irresistible
passion and would lead almost anyone to do what Patricio Maez did.
Does it therefor follow that the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
shows Patricio Maez to be guilty of voluntary manslaughter? That is
the hard question. A killing caused by an irresistible passion aroused
by an act sufficient to put the mind of a reasonable person in that sort of
a state that was there, the evidence shows it was there.
I believe then that the situation that we have is this: That the
record, if this case were presented to the higher court, would sustain the
verdicts upon an assignment of error that the verdicts were contrary to
the evidence, or that the evidence didn't warrant the verdicts. But does
it necessarily negative the possibility that he acted in self-defense? I
don't think that there would be a possibility of a reversal upon that
question, and that leaves the other phase of the thing which is so difficult
to determine. Whether that prejudice that was manifest (at least to a
mind trained to watch for those things) did influence the verdict? Or
it better be put, is the situation such that an honest man can say that it
absolutely, certainly did not influence the verdict? I think we will have
to go that far.
I am telling you candidly and honestly that I have thought of this
for hours ever since the trial whenever the subject would happen to come
to my mind, and I tell you just as frankly that I am yet uncertain what
the proper answer is. It is impossible to get anything tangible that you
could put in the record in words that would be an answer to that question. I believe ultimately the court will have to decide it from what he
knows, observed, believes and what his conscience tells him are the facts
in the matter and I repeat I am not yet ready to answer that question.
I want to take this matter under advisement. Counsel have said all they
could say, have done all they can do. There is no one to give the court
any further assistance in this matter but I am not so constituted that I
can decide a question of the seriousness of this question without being
entirely clear in my own mind and conscience; and until I have arrived
at that state of mind, I don't want to decide it. I appreciate that this is
an unusual sort of a statement to come from the bench, but I wish to
'call your attention to the fact that it is an unusual situation that we
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have here. I don't think any of us has ever seen anything approaching
it in our past experience. I don't know how long it will take but since
this matter has gone for some little time there will not be any harm nor
any charge of delay, unjustifiable delay, if the court takes a few more
days or a few more weeks to enable him to clear up the doubt which
exists in his mind, and with that explanation I. merely announce that
the matter is taken under advisement."
Thereafter the motion for a new trial was sustained by the judge
and Maez tried in Alamosa County for the murder of Dominquez and
Ortega.
The jury was out about two hours bringing in an acquittal on both
counts. The case was prosecuted by District Attorney Leonard M.
Haynie, his deputy, Ralph Horton, and George Blickhahn as special
prosecutor, and defended by George M. Corlett and Charles R. Corlett.

Colorado Junior Bar Conference
The Colorado Junior Bar Conference held its semi-annual meeting on Sunday, May 25, at the Albany Hotel in Denver.
Mr. William E. Hutton, President of the Colorado Bar Association,
made a very inspiring address at the luncheon in regard to the lack of
morality of present international affairs and also informed the group of
the plans for the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association at
Colorado Springs on September 12-13. John O'Hagan of Greeley presided at the meeting.
Preceding the luncheon, the various committees of the Conference
held their meetings, and at a general business meeting following the
luncheon the committee reports were made and plans were laid for continuation of the Conference work.
The Committee on*Judicial Selection has made a very comprehensive survey of this project, which had its inception in the Colorado
Junior Bar Conference in Colorado.
The Conference was informed by the Economic Survey Committee
that the survey was completed and would be in the hands of the various
lawyers in the state by June 15. This survey will be completely anonymous and is designed to obtain information in regard to the nature of
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practice and the possibilities of practice in the various sections of the
state.
The Committee on Public Information will begin a series of radio
programs pointing out the advantages of the democratic form of government and explaining the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act and the
National Selective Service Act.
The Conference will hold its annual meeting at Colorado Springs
on September 13 at noon. Further information in regard to this meeting
will appear in a future publication of DICTA.

Convention Set for September 12-13 at Colorado Springs
The forty-fourth annual convention will be held at Colorado
Springs on September 12-13, 1941, the Executive Committee of the
Colorado Bar Association decided in its recent meeting. Designation of
the convention hotel was left to the Convention Committee. President
Hutton has appointed Edward L. Wood of Denver chairman of that
committee. Mr. Wood was chairman of the committee which last year
so ably planned the 1940 meeting. A tentative program of the convention will be announced in the July issue of DICTA.
The Board of Governors also voted to dispense with the publication of the 1941 annual report as a separate volume, and to publish a
condensation of the proceedings in DICTA. This resolution will effect a
saving of approximately one thousand dollars in bar funds.
The District Attorneys Association and the County Judges Associations became sections of the Colorado Bar by approval of the Board.
This action by the associations brings within the fold of the State Bar
all organizations of attorneys and judges within the state, and promises
a unified program of action.
The petition for. membership by the Continental Divide Bar Association, consisting of Summit. Lake, Eagle, Park and Chaffee counties,
was accepted. This local bar association now covers the only region in
the state where there were no local associations. With its organization
every section in the state is now organized. J. Corder Smith of Leadville
was selected to act on the Board of Governors as representative of the
Continental Divide Bar Association.

